In the words of Fancourt J, the case of Pridewell Properties (London) Limited v Spirit Pub Company (Management) Limited (2026) EWHC 953 (Ch) (the Pridewell Case”) “raises an important general question on the operation of the 1954 Act”.
Ground (f) in the 1954 Act begins “On the termination of the current tenancy the landlord intends to demolish or reconstruct the premises …”. Ground (g) provides “That on the termination of the current tenancy the landlord intends to occupy the holding …”. Both grounds incorporate the same words “on the termination of the current tenancy”.
Following a series of earlier decisions, by February 2025, Norris J felt able to say in MVL Properties (2017) Limited v Leadmill (2025) EWHC 349 (CH) “By judicial gloss the requirement to intend so to act “on the termination of the current tenancy” is satisfied by an intention so to act within a reasonable time after the termination of the current tenancy …”. However Fancourt J (“the Appeal Judge”) has now effectively stated, in the Pridewell case, that the gloss described by Norris J is wrong. Instead, “In a case where it is known that various other steps will have to be taken before the landlord can set about the works, it is unlikely that the landlord can prove its intent to do the works on termination …”, (see paragraph 7).
The article examines the Pridewell Case and explains the restriction that it places upon a landlord seeking to invoke ground (f) or ground (g), in order to oppose the tenant’s application for a new lease.
DISCUSSION OF THE PRIDEWELL CASE
In the Pridewell Case, Pridewell was the landlord and Spirit Pub the tenant. The premises in question were a public house known as the Railway Bell in South Woodford. The landlord was a single purpose vehicle that had been formed for the purpose of exploiting the development potential of the premises. The landlord intended to build three new mews houses within the beer garden area, and reconstruct and extend the existing building to provide a pub on the ground floor and six self-contained flats on the upper floors. The landlord opposed the tenant’s application for a new lease relying on ground (f). The issue at trial was whether, in accordance with established case law, the landlord had satisfied the Court that it had a “reasonable prospect” of obtaining planning permission and funding for the landlord’s scheme, such that it would be able to carry out the works “on the termination of the current tenancy”.
By the time of the trial the landlord had not obtained planning permission for its proposed scheme. Indeed it has not applied for planning permission. It is well established that the landlord can still succeed on ground (f) without having obtained planning permission. That planning permission would need to be obtained in time for the works to start on the termination of the current tenancy. The Trial Judge held that “it would take between 10 and 14 months after possession of the premises was obtained to obtain planning permission and be ready to start the building work.” Applying what the Trial Judge understood to be the orthodox approach, he decided that, in all the circumstances, 10 to 14 months after possession was a reasonable time and so was “on the termination of the current tenancy”.
After reviewing prior authorities the Appeal Judge asked himself at [67] “what relatively short period can reasonably be added to the possession date will be property – (and other circumstances) – specific”. The Judge contrasted two situations. At [68], he said “If a landlord intends to set about the works on recovering possession, it intends to do them on termination of the tenancy”. However at [69] he said “If, on the other hand, the landlord intends to use the property for something else, or to leave it empty for a period, or if it cannot yet set about the works because there is something else that needs to be done first, then it does not intend to do the works on termination of the tenancy within the meaning of the statute”.
The above analysis resulted in the Appeal Judge saying at [70] “In a case where it is known that various other steps will have to be taken before the landlord can set about the works, it is unlikely that the landlord can prove its intention to do the works on termination”.
In the Pridewell Case, the landlord was not able to submit its planning application prior to the trial because that application required access for certain investigations, and the Tenant had refused access.The Trial Judge had allowed time to carry out those investigations as part of the “reasonable time”, seemingly allowed by ground (f). However, the Appeal Judge disagreed. At [73] he said “The fact that the landlord was unable to get further ahead with the planning process because the tenant would not permit entry onto the premises to carry out intrusive investigations is neither here nor there. Those were the consequences of the terms of the parties’ bargain”. While that difficulty explained why a reasonable estimation of the time required to be able to start the works was 10-14 months after the possession date, it did not mean that the landlord intended to carry out the works “at (or within a reasonably short time of) the termination of the tenancy”.
CONCLUSION
The Judge’s view, as per [70], is that if there are steps to be taken before the landlord can begin its work then “it is unlikely that the landlord can prove its intention to do the works on termination”. Hence, in the Pridewell Case, as the landlord had not begun the application for planning permission the landlord could not rely upon ground (f). The above reasoning, and in particular, the above construction of the words “on the termination of the current tenancy” applies both to ground (f) and ground (g), where there is some step to be taken before the landlord can begin to occupy it.
It is likely that the reasoning in the Pridewell Case will restrict the usefulness of ground (f) or (g), where there is still some step or steps to be taken in order to satisfy the landlord’s intention, such as obtaining planning permission. Landlords, suitably advised, will now have to be cautioned as to the deployment of ground (f) or ground (g) if the circumstances are those described by Fancourt J at [70] in the Pridewell Case.
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